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We	  start	  this	  overview	  by	  discussing	  the	  place	  of	  emotions	  within	  the	  broader	  affective	  domain	  –	  
how	  different	  are	  emotions	  from	  moods,	  sensations	  and	  affective	  dispositions?	  Next,	  we	  examine	  
the	  way	  emotions	  relate	  to	  their	  objects,	  emphasizing	  in	  the	  process	  their	  intimate	  relations	  to	  
values.	  We	  move	  from	  this	  inquiry	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  emotion	  to	  an	  inquiry	  into	  their	  epistemology.	  
Do	  they	  provide	  reasons	  for	  evaluative	  judgements	  and,	  more	  generally,	  do	  they	  contribute	  to	  our	  
knowledge	  of	  values?	  	  We	  then	  address	  the	  question	  of	  the	  social	  dimension	  of	  emotions,	  explaining	  
	  	  
how	  the	  traditional	  nature	  vs.	  nurture	  contrast	  applies	  to	  the	  emotions.	  We	  finish	  by	  exploring	  the	  
relations	  between	  emotions,	  motivation	  and	  action,	  concluding	  this	  overview	  with	  a	  more	  specific	  
focus	  on	  how	  these	  relations	  bear	  on	  some	  central	  ethical	  issues.	  	  
	  
	  
Imagine	  that	  you	  overhear	  someone	  making	  fun	  of	  a	  close	  friend	  of	  yours.	  You	  take	  offense.	  Anger	  
flares	   up.	   Physiological	   changes,	   involving	   a	   variety	   of	   processes	   controlled	   by	   the	   autonomic	  
nervous	  system,	  are	  triggered.	  Your	  heart	  pounds	  and	  you	  hold	  your	  breath.	  Your	  brows	  narrow	  as	  
you	  stare	  at	   the	  author	  of	   the	   joke,	  your	  attention	   fixed	  upon	  him.	  Your	  body	  feels	   tense	  and	  you	  
clench	  your	  fists.	  Thoughts	  cross	  your	  mind	  in	  quick	  succession.	  What	  a	  mean	  thing	  to	  suggest	  about	  
your	   friend,	   you	   think.	   Should	   you	   walk	   away,	   be	   rude,	   or	   do	   something	   more	   extreme	   such	   as	  
hitting	  the	  offender?	  	  
It	   is	   clear	   that	   emotions	   such	   as	   anger	   raise	   fascinating	   philosophical	   issues.	   In	   this	   overview,	  we	  
concentrate	  on	  the	  following	  ones.	  The	  first	  section	  considers	  the	  question	  of	  how	  emotions	  such	  as	  
the	   episode	   of	   anger	   described	   above	   may	   differ	   from	   other	   affective	   phenomena	   using	   three	  
central	   distinctions	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	   mind:	   those	   between	   mental	   dispositions	   and	   mental	  
episodes,	   between	   experiences	   and	   other	   mental	   states,	   and	   between	   intentional	   and	  
nonintentional	   states.	   In	   the	   second	   section,	   we	   turn	   to	   the	   question	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   emotions	  
themselves.	  The	  general	  issue	  here	  concerns	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  emotions	  are	  evaluations	  and	  how	  
best	   to	   characterize	   this	   aspect	   of	   them	   in	   psychological	   terms.	   For	   instance,	   should	   we	   think	   of	  
them	   as	   judgements,	   perceptions	   or	   something	   else?	   Does	   getting	   angry	   in	   the	   way	   suggested	  
consist	  in	  judging	  that	  the	  joke	  was	  offensive	  or	  perhaps	  in	  perceiving	  the	  offensiveness	  of	  the	  joke?	  
The	   third	   section	   is	   concerned	  with	   the	   epistemological	   role	   of	   emotions	   in	   relation	   to	   evaluative	  
judgements.	  For	  instance,	  does	  your	  anger	  provide	  reasons	  for	  thinking	  that	  the	  joke	  was	  offensive?	  
We	  then	  consider,	  in	  the	  fourth	  section,	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  apply	  the	  nature	  vs.	  nurture	  
contrast	  to	  emotions.	  To	  stay	  with	  our	  example,	  does	  culture	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  way	  you	  get	  angry	  or	  
are	  angry,	  and	   if	   so,	  what	   is	   it?	  The	   relation	  between	  emotions	  and	  motivation	   is	   the	   topic	  of	   the	  
fifth	  section.	  What	  is	  the	  relation	  between	  your	  anger	  and	  your	  desire	  to	  be	  rude	  or	  even	  to	  hit	  the	  
offender?	  This	  then	  leads	  us	  to	  the	  sixth	  and	  final	  section,	  in	  which	  we	  theorize	  about	  the	  variety	  of	  
roles	   emotions	   play	   in	   ethics	   and,	  more	   specifically,	  whether	  we	   can	   appeal	   to	   them	   to	   elucidate	  
moral	  motivation	   and	  moral	   judgement.	   Can	  we	   think	  of	   your	   angry	   reaction	   towards	   the	   joke	   as	  
having	  moral	  significance?	  	  
	  	  
	  
EMOTION	  AND	  THE	  AFFECTIVE	  DOMAIN	  
When	  we	  inquire	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  emotions,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  issues	  concerns	  how	  similar	  they	  are	  
to	   neighbouring	   phenomena	   such	   as	   moods,	   sentiments,	   passions,	   desires,	   feelings	   and	   the	   like.	  
Confronted	   with	   similar	   taxonomical	   issues	   in	   other	   areas	   of	   the	   mental,	   philosophers	   have	  
equipped	  themselves	  with	  notions	  and	  distinctions	  that	  allow	  making	  some	  progress	  with	  respect	  to	  
this	   issue.	   These	  are:	   the	  distinction	  between	  what	   takes	  place	  or	  happens	   (mental	   episodes)	   and	  
more	  stable	  conditions	  (mental	  dispositions);	  the	  distinction	  between	  states	  with	  a	  phenomenal	  or	  
qualitative	  character	  (experiences)	  and	  those	  with	  no	  such	  character;	  the	  distinction	  between	  states	  
that	  are	  directed	  at	  things	  beyond	  themselves	  (what	  philosophers	  call	  intentional	  states)	  and	  those	  
that	  are	  not.	  
The	   distinction	   between	   episodes	   and	   dispositions	   helps	   demarcate	   two	   sorts	   of	   affective	  
phenomena.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  are	  affective	  phenomena	  that	  have	  an	  onset,	  wax,	  wane,	  and	  
then	  disappear	  after	  what	   is	  often	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  are	  stable	  and	  
relatively	  long-­‐lasting	  states	  that	  characterize	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  people	  tend	  to	  engage	  affectively	  
with	   the	  world.1,2	   For	   example,	   if	   you	   say	   “Sam	   is	   angry	  with	  his	   father”,	   you	  may	  be	  understood	  
either	   as	   saying	   that	   Sam	   is	   currently	   undergoing	   an	   episode	  of	   anger,	   or	   as	   saying	   that	   he	   has	   a	  
disposition	  to	  get	  angry	  with	  his	  father,	  although	  he	  is	  presently	  happily	  thinking	  about	  his	  mother	  or	  
even	  asleep.	  Having	  the	  disposition	  to	  get	  angry	  at	  one’s	  father	  in	  this	  way	  implies	  that	  one	  is	  likely	  
to	   enter	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   episodes	   of	   anger	   (these	   are	   the	   manifestations	   of	   the	   disposition)	   in	  
circumstances	   involving	   the	   parent	   in	   question	   (these	   are	   its	   triggering	   conditions).	   Most	  
philosophers,	  but	  not	  all3,4,	  use	  the	  term	  “emotion”	  to	  refer	  to	  episodes	  –	  a	  practice	  that	  might	  not	  
follow	  ordinary	  usage	  –	  and	  use	  the	  technical	  term	  “emotional	  disposition”	  to	  refer	  to	  more	  or	  less	  
stable	   manners	   to	   engage	   affectively	   with	   the	   world.	   “Cares”,	   “concerns”,	   “attachments”,	  
“sentiments”	   and	   “personality	   or	   character	   traits”	   are	  ordinary	   terms	   that	   are	   sometimes	  used	   to	  
characterize	  subsets	  of	  these	  dispositions.	  	  
This	   distinction	   between	   episodes	   and	   dispositions,	   which	   is	   in	   itself	   not	   controversial,	   raises	   a	  
number	   of	   interesting	   philosophical	   issues.	   First,	   should	   we	   draw	   further	   distinctions	   among	   the	  
affective	  dispositions	  and,	   if	   so,	  what	  are	   the	   relevant	   criteria?5	  Although	  arachnophobia	  and	   love	  
for	   one’s	   country	   both	   count	   as	   affective	   dispositions,	   for	   example,	   they	   may	   invite	   different	  
analyses.	   Second,	   while	   it	   is	   generally	   thought	   that	   many	   if	   not	   all	   affective	   episodes	   are	  
manifestations	   of	   affective	   dispositions	   –	   one’s	   present	   anger	   at	   one’s	   uncle’s	   seemingly	  
inconsiderate	  behaviour	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  one’s	  lack	  of	  patience	  for	  his	  selfishness	  –	  this	  leaves	  
	  	  
the	   question	   of	   explanatory	   priority	   completely	   open.	   Do	   emotional	   dispositions	   really	   have	   a	  
psychological	   reality	   over	   and	   above	   that	   of	   these	   episodes?	  Or	   should	  we	   try	   to	   explain	   them	   in	  
terms	  of	  emotional	  episodes?	  Should	  we	  on	  the	  contrary	  explain	  the	  episodes	  in	  terms	  of	  emotional	  
dispositions,	  i.e.	  do	  episodes	  constitutively	  depend	  on	  the	  dispositions	  they	  manifest?	  Alternatively,	  
there	  may	  be	  reasons	  to	  refrain	  from	  any	  such	  priority	  claim	  so	  as	  to	  preserve	  the	  possibility	  of	  there	  
being	  interesting	  (explanatory,	  epistemic	  or	  otherwise)	  relations	  between	  them.6	  
The	  second	  distinction	  can	  also	  be	  put	  to	  use.	  Emotions	  are	  paradigmatic	  states	  with	  qualitative	  or	  
phenomenal	  character.	  There	  is	  something	  it	   is	   like	  to	  have	  them:	  they	  are	  experiences.7-­‐9	  Observe	  
that	   they	   differ	   from	   affective	   dispositions	   in	   this	   respect	   too	   –	   lack	   of	   patience	   for	   one’s	   uncle’s	  
selfishness	  does	  not	  feel	  like	  anything	  independently	  of	  the	  emotions	  it	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  –	  as	  well	  as	  
from	  other	  mental	   episodes	  –	   such	  as	   judgements,	  perhaps,	   since	   it	   is	   at	   least	  not	  obvious	   that	   it	  
feels	   like	   anything	   to	   judge	   that	   two	   and	   two	   make	   four.10,11	   This	   is	   of	   course	   not	   to	   say	   that	  
emotions	  are	  the	  only	  affective	  experiences,	  since,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  moods	  qualify	  too.	  
Scrutiny	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   dimension	   of	   the	   emotions	   raises	   some	   of	   the	   most	   traditional	   and	  
central	  questions	   in	   the	   field.	  First,	  are	  all	  emotions	  conscious	  phenomena?	  One	  plausible	  claim	   is	  
that	  we	  need	  not	  be	  conscious	  of	  an	  emotion	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  aware	  of	  it	  in	  order	  to	  undergo	  it.	  
One	  need	  not	  realize	  one	  is	  afraid	  to	  be	  afraid,	  as	  one’s	  attention	  in	  fear	  is	  typically	  directed	  toward	  
what	   one	   is	   afraid	   of.	   Second,	   should	  we	   leave	   room	   for	   a	  more	   dramatic	   claim,	   i.e.	   that	  we	   can	  
undergo	   emotions	   without	   feeling	   anything?10,12	   While	   the	   former	   claim	   is	   accepted	   by	   a	   vast	  
majority	   of	   philosophers,12,13	   the	   latter	   has	   not	   proven	   as	   popular.	   In	   psychology,	   however,	   some	  
have	  found	  it	  helpful	  to	  distinguish	  feeling	  an	  emotion	  and	  having	  it,	  since	  there	  may	  be	  behavioural	  
or	  neurophysiological	  evidence	  of	  an	  emotion’s	  occurrence	  without	  any	  evidence	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  
feeling	   it.14,15	   Now,	   whether	   or	   not	   having	   an	   emotion	   is	   feeling,	   the	   nature	   of	   emotional	  
phenomenology	   raises	   fascinating	   questions	   such	   as	   the	   following.	   Is	   this	   phenomenology	  
sufficiently	   rich	   so	   as	   to	   support	   a	   significant	   proportion	   of	   the	   distinctions	   amongst	   types	   of	  
emotions	  we	  find	  in	  ordinary	  language?	  Many	  philosophers	  and	  psychologists	  have	  thought	  not16,17,	  
arguing	  that	  one	  and	  the	  same	  phenomenology	  is,	  taken	  on	  its	  own,	  compatible	  with	  emotions	  we	  
ordinarily	   consider	   to	   be	   very	   different.	   Furthermore,	   while	   many	   emotions	   obviously	   involve	  
experiencing	  alterations	  of	  one’s	  bodily	  condition	  along	  various	  dimensions	  (muscular,	  physiological,	  
endocrinal,	  etc.),	  can	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  all	  emotions	  be	  captured	  in	  bodily	  terms?3,13	  Finally,	  is	  it	  
a	  characteristic	   trait	  of	  undergoing	  emotions	  that	   it	   feels	  either	  good	  or	  bad	  to	  undergo	  them,	   i.e.	  
that	  they	  have	  either	  a	  positive	  or	  a	  negative	  hedonic	  tone?	  This	  last	  question	  is	  intimately	  related	  to	  
the	  project	  of	  explaining	  what	  is	  called	  the	  valence	  of	  emotions.18,19	  	  	  
	  	  
The	  third	  distinction,	  between	  states	  that	  are	  directed	  at	  something	  (states	  that	  have	  intentionality)	  
and	   states	   that	   are	   not	   (states	   that	   have	   no	   intentionality),	   can	   also	   be	   used	   to	   draw	   further	  
boundaries	  within	  the	  affective	  realm.	  Observe	  that	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  striking	  contrast	  between	  
paradigmatic	  bodily	  sensations	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  emotional	  experiences	  on	  the	  other.8,20,21	  The	  
former,	  like	  tickles	  or	  a	  shiver	  down	  the	  spine,	  are	  not	  directed	  at	  anything	  or	  at	  least	  not	  anything	  
outside	  the	  body.	  This	  is	  certainly	  not	  the	  case	  of	  one’s	  run	  of	  the	  mill	  emotions,	  such	  as	  fear,	  anger,	  
admiration	  and	  amusement,	  which	  rarely	  if	  ever	  target	  one’s	  own	  bodily	  condition(s)	  but	  are	  rather	  
about	  worldly	  objects,	  events	  and	  states	  of	  affairs.	  One	  is	  angry	  at	  one’s	  father,	  admires	  a	  mountain	  
view,	  is	  amused	  by	  the	  joke,	  regrets	  that	  Jeanne	  could	  not	  come	  to	  the	  party,	  and	  so	  on.	  Still,	  while	  it	  
is	   clear	   that	   emotions	   are	   about	   worldly	   objects,	   it	   is	   unclear	   whether	   this	   aspect	   of	   their	  
intentionality	  is	  or	  is	  not	  purely	  derivative	  from	  the	  thoughts	  that	  accompany	  these	  emotions.	  Why	  
not	  say	  that	  my	  fear	  of	  the	  exam	  just	  consists	  in	  a	  thought	  being	  directed	  at	  the	  upcoming	  exam	  and	  
accompanied	   by	   sensations	   typical	   of	   fear	   but	  which	   have	   in	   themselves	   no	   intentionality?29-­‐31	  Or	  
should	  we	  say	  that	   it	   is	  a	  nonintentional	  displeasure	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  realisation	  that	  one’s	  desire	  
for	   not	   being	   examined	   in	   the	   near	   future	   is	   frustrated?32	   However	   one	   wants	   to	   answer	   these	  
questions,	  we	  shall	  see	   in	  the	  next	  section	  that	  there	   is	  another	  aspect	  of	  emotional	   intentionality	  
that	  may	  be	  original	  (i.e.	  nonderivative)	  to	  them.	  
Before	  we	  turn	  to	  that,	  this	  is	  the	  place	  to	  observe	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  emotions	  are	  directed	  outside	  
the	   body	   explains	   why	   philosophers	   have	   been	   on	   the	   whole	   reluctant	   to	   assimilate	   them	   to	  
assortments	   of	   bodily	   sensations,	   a	   claim	   which	   is	   rightly	   or	   wrongly	   associated	   with	   William	  
James.22,23	  If	  this	  contrast	  at	  the	  level	  of	  intentionality	  distinguishes	  emotions	  from	  sensations,	  it	  also	  
distinguishes	   them	   from	  moods.	   Moods,	   it	   is	   often	   claimed,24	   are	   episodic	   in	   nature	   and	   have	   a	  
phenomenal	  character.	  They	  may	  have	  the	  same	  duration	  as	  emotions	  (although	  this	  is	  not	  typical	  of	  
them),	   but	   contrary	   to	   emotions	   they	   are	   not	   intentionally	   directed	   towards	   anything.	   It	   certainly	  
feels	  like	  something	  to	  be	  grumpy,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  one	  can	  be	  grumpy	  about	  or	  at	  something.	  	  
Amongst	   the	   lively	  debates	   surrounding	   these	   issues,	   the	   following	  should	  be	  singled	  out.	   Is	   there	  
really	   a	   categorical	   difference	   between	   emotions	   and	   moods	   at	   the	   level	   of	   their	   respective	  
intentionality,	  or	   is	   it	   rather	  a	  mere	  difference	   in	  degree?25-­‐27	   Should	  we	  not	   say	   for	  example	   that	  
grumpiness	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  sort	  of	  irritation	  directed	  at	  the	  world	  at	  large	  and	  thus	  that	  moods	  have	  just	  
less	  specific	  objects	  than	  emotions?3	  And	  what	  should	  we	  say	  of	  the	  following	  very	  common	  sort	  of	  
case:	  while	  angry	  at	  your	  boss,	  you	  are	  made	  to	  remember	  a	  very	  funny	  joke.	  We	  may	  surmise	  that	  
part	  of	  the	  way	  it	  feels	  to	  be	  angry	  endures	  while	  you	  remember	  the	  joke.	  Still,	  should	  we	  say	  that	  
you	  are	  angry	  at	  your	  boss	  and	  amused	  by	  the	  joke,	  or	  that	  you	  are	  in	  an	  irritated	  mood	  that	  will	  be	  
redirected	  to	  your	  boss	  as	  soon	  as	  your	  attention	  is	  drawn	  away	  from	  the	  joke?24,28	  	  
	  	  
	  
EMOTIONS	  AND	  EVALUATIONS	  
Emotions	   are	   about	   something;	   they	   are	   intentional	   states.	   This	   may,	   as	   we	   suggested,	   help	  
distinguish	   emotions	   from	  moods	   and	   sensations,	   but	   it	   is	   certainly	   not	   distinctive	   of	   them.	   You	  
could	   imagine	   your	   boss	   or	   believe	   that	   your	   boss	   asked	   you	   to	   stay	   after	   hours.	   So	   is	   there	  
something	   distinctive	   and	   original	   to	   the	   intentionality	   of	   emotions?	   There	   are	   some	   substantive	  
reasons	   to	   think	   so.	   Emotions	   seem	   after	   all	   to	   be	   some	   sorts	   of	   positive	   or	   negative	   attitudes	  
towards	  the	  world.	  Can	  we	  say	  more?	  	  
It	   looks	  as	   if	   the	  distinct	  types	  of	  emotions	  are	  distinct	  types	  of	  positive	  or	  negative	  evaluations	  of	  
what	  they	  are	  about.33	  It	  makes	  a	  lot	  of	  sense	  to	  think	  of,	  say,	  anger	  as	  a	  way	  of	  evaluating	  an	  object	  
as	   offensive	   or	   obstructive,	   as	   it	   makes	   sense	   to	   think	   of	   fear	   as	   an	   evaluation	   of	   an	   object	   as	  
dangerous,	  of	  amusement	  as	  an	  evaluation	  of	  an	  object	  as	  funny,	  and	  of	  shame	  as	  an	  evaluation	  of	  
an	  object	  as	  degraded.34,35	  This	   readily	  explains	  many	  aspects	  of	   the	  way	  we	  consider	  emotions	   in	  
everyday	   life.	   If	   emotions	   are	   evaluations,	   we	   understand	   why	   we	   sometimes	   criticize	   (“you	  
shouldn’t	   be	   afraid”)	   or	   recommend	   (“you	   should	   show	   some	   compassion”)	   emotions.	   The	   idea,	  
then,	  is	  that	  a	  type	  of	  emotion	  can	  be	  about	  a	  great	  variety	  of	  objects	  (you	  can	  fear	  the	  snake,	  the	  
exam,	   your	   uncle,	   death,	   etc.),	   but	   that	   it	   always	   evaluates	   it	   in	   the	   same	  way	   (as	   a	   threatening	  
object).	   This	   would	   constitute	   the	   distinctive	   and	   original	   intentional	   aspect	   of	   emotions	   –	   in	  
philosophical	  jargon,	  the	  evaluative	  property	  in	  light	  of	  which	  the	  particular	  object	  is	  apprehended	  is	  
called	  the	  formal	  object	  of	  the	  emotion.36	  
According	   to	   some	   classical	  ways	   of	   understanding	  why	   emotions	   qualify	   as	   evaluations,	   the	   idea	  
that	  this	  constitutes	  an	  original	  aspect	  of	  their	  intentionality	  appears	  difficult	  to	  maintain,	  however.	  
Consider	   for	   instance	   the	  very	  simple	  suggestion,	  apparently	  held	  by	   the	  Stoics,	   that	  emotions	  are	  
evaluative	  judgements	  –	  to	  be	  angry	  at	  your	  boss	  is	  to	  judge	  that	  he	  is	  offensive	  or	  obstructive,	  to	  be	  
ashamed	  of	  yourself	  is	  to	  think	  that	  you	  are	  degraded.37,38	  	  Emotions	  would	  relate	  to	  the	  world	  in	  a	  
way	  with	  which	  we	  are	  familiar	   from	  our	  ordinary	   judgements,	  and	  there	  would	  accordingly	  be	  no	  
original	  aspect	   to	   their	   intentionality.	  Be	   that	  as	   it	  may,	   the	   judgement	  approach	  has	  a	  number	  of	  
potential	  problems.	  First,	  one	  may	  wonder	  whether	  undergoing	  an	  emotion	  requires	  that	  the	  subject	  
make	   the	   relevant	   evaluative	   judgement.	   Sometimes	  we	   feel	   emotions	   despite	   not	   endorsing	   the	  
sort	  of	  evaluation	  they	  contain,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  when	  we	  react	  in	  a	  way	  we	  know	  is	   inappropriate.	  A	  
spider	  phobic,	  for	  example,	  does	  not	  need	  to	  judge	  the	  spider	  to	  be	  dangerous	  to	  fear	  it.39,40	  One	  can	  
be	  tempted,	  therefore,	  to	  adjust	  one’s	  way	  of	  conceiving	  of	  the	  emotions	  by	  claiming	  that	  emotions,	  
as	   opposed	   to	   judgements,	   do	   not	   involve	   the	   subject’s	   endorsement	   of	   the	   relevant	   evaluation.	  
	  	  
Perhaps	   thinking	  of	   the	  object	   in	   the	   relevant	  evaluative	   terms	   is	  enough.35,41	  To	  be	  angry	  at	  your	  
boss	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  thinking	  of	  him	  as	  offensive.	  The	  temptation	  should	  be	  resisted,	  however.	  
For,	  second,	  understanding	  the	  emotions	  in	  terms	  of	  judgements	  or	  thoughts	  simply	  misses	  the	  fact	  
that	  emotions	  are	  specific	   types	  of	  experiences.	  To	   judge	   that	   someone	   is	  offensive,	   if	   it	   feels	   like	  
anything,	  need	  not	  feel	  anything	  like	  experiencing	  an	  episode	  of	  anger.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  even	  clearer	  
in	   the	  case	  of	  a	  mere	   thought	   to	   the	  same	  effect	   in	  which	   the	  subject	  does	  not	  even	  endorse	   the	  
evaluation.8,42	  Third	  and	  relatedly,	  evaluative	   judgements	  and	  thoughts	  are	  not	  obviously	  available	  
to	  at	  least	  some	  non-­‐human	  animals	  to	  which	  we	  surely	  want	  to	  ascribe	  emotions.43,44	  
It	   is	  with	  these	  worries	  in	  mind	  that	  one	  may	  try	  to	  understand	  the	  distinctive	  evaluative	  aspect	  of	  
emotions	   along	   different	   lines.	   We	   should	   not	   appeal	   to	   judgement	   or	   thought,	   but	   rather	   to	  
perception,	   perhaps	   the	   paradigmatic	   type	   of	   mental	   states	   in	   relation	   to	   which	   we	   speak	   of	  
experience.	  The	  idea	  is	  that,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  an	  object	  may	  visually	  strike	  you	  as	  being	  scarlet,	  it	  
may	  emotionally	  strike	  you	  as	  being	  offensive	  or	  dangerous,	  and	  that	  the	  underlying	  similarities	  run	  
sufficiently	   deep	   so	   as	   to	  warrant	   talk	   of	   emotion	   in	   terms	   of	   perception.	   This	   analogy	   has	   been	  
made	  forcefully	  by	  Ronald	  de	  Sousa28	  and	  has	  been	  turned	  into	  a	  variety	  of	  perceptual	  approaches	  
to	  the	  emotions.13,45-­‐52	  This	  would	  not	  only	  be	  faithful	  to	  the	  phenomenal	  dimension	  of	  emotions,	  it	  
would	  in	  addition	  account	  appealingly	  for	  the	  other	  problems	  faced	  by	  the	  more	  intellectual	  takes	  on	  
evaluation	  discussed	  previously.	  In	  particular,	  one	  may	  now	  think	  of	  phobias	  on	  the	  model	  of	  some	  
illusions	  we	  are	  familiar	  with	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  perception.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  as	  experiencing	  a	  stick	  half-­‐
immersed	  in	  water	  as	  bent	  does	  not	  force	  one	  to	  judge	  that	  the	  stick	  is	  bent,	  experiencing	  one’s	  boss	  
as	  offensive	  need	  not	  lead	  one	  to	  judge	  that	  she	  is	  offensive.39,40	  In	  both	  cases,	  one	  can	  know	  better.	  
Moreover,	   representing	   danger	   or	   offensiveness	   perceptually	   may	   be	   supported	   by	   cognitive	  
capacities	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  animals	  possess.	  
While	  the	  perceptual	  model	  is	  very	  appealing,	  it	  faces	  some	  important	  challenges.53-­‐55	  Observe,	  first,	  
that	   although	   perceptual	   experiences	   have,	   like	   emotions,	   a	   salient	   phenomenology,	   it	   is	   not	  
obviously	  of	  the	  right	  sort	  to	  help	  shed	  light	  on	  emotional	  experiences.	  In	  experiencing	  an	  emotion,	  
it	   feels	   like	  one	   is	  reacting	  to	  or	  taking	  a	  stance	  towards	  what	   is	  represented.	  This	  seems	  to	  differ	  
significantly	   from	   the	   kind	   of	   purely	   receptive	   phenomenology	   characteristic	   of,	   say,	   ordinary	  
auditory	  or	  visual	  perception.	  Honouring	  one	  of	  the	  central	  promises	  made	  by	  the	  perceptual	  model	  
will	   then	   be	   harder	   than	  might	   first	   appear.	   Second,	   in	   perception,	   properties	   are	   thought	   to	   be	  
causally	   responsible	   for	   the	   perceptual	   experiences.	   But	   what	   exactly	   are	   the	   properties	   that	  
emotions	   allegedly	   perceive,	   and	   can	   they	   play	   the	   relevant	   causal	   role?	   If	   they	   are	   evaluative	  
properties,	   as	   commonly	   conceived	   within	   the	  models	   under	   discussion,	   this	   raises	   the	   following	  
worries.	  The	  idea	  seems	  to	  presuppose	  a	  controversial	  form	  of	  realism	  about	  evaluative	  properties,	  
	  	  
i.e.	   the	   claim	   that	   these	   properties	   are	   ‘out	   there’	   and	   apt	   to	   cause	   psychological	   responses.	   In	  
addition,	   it	   seems	   to	   presuppose	   a	   view	   of	   what	   perception	   consists	   in	   that	   is	   liberal	   enough	   to	  
welcome	   the	   claim	   that	   evaluative	   properties	   can	   be	   perceived.	   Third,	   observe	   that	  many	   of	   our	  
emotions	   are	   elicited	   by	   thoughts	   about	   events	   or	   objects	   that	   are	   spatially	   and	   temporally	   quite	  
distant	  from	  us.	  The	  fact	  that	  accounting	  for	  these	  cases	  in	  perceptual	  terms	  is	  not	  straightforward	  
reveals	  an	   important	  disanalogy	  between	  emotions	  and	  perceptions.	  While	   the	   former	  depend	  on	  
other	  mental	  states64	  so	  as	  to	  have	  a	  subject	  matter,	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  latter	  resides	  precisely	  in	  
their	  being	  independent	  on	  this	  count.	  One	  cannot	  be	  angry	  at	  one’s	  boss	  without	  this	  presupposing	  
that	  one	  represents	  her	  in	  another	  way	  (through	  imagination,	  memory,	  belief,	  perception,	  etc.).	  But	  
no	  additional	  mental	  state	  needs	  to	  play	  this	  role	  in	  order	  to	  visually	  represent	  one’s	  boss.	  
These	  challenges	  may	  very	  well	  be	  met	  by	  the	  perceptual	  model	  –	  perhaps	  the	  above	  remarks	  are	  
premised	   on	   too	   conservative	   a	   view	   of	   perception,	   for	   instance.	   According	   to	   one	   such	   less	  
conservative	   view,	   perception	   consists	   at	   bottom	   in	   systematic	   causal	   covariations	   selected	   by	  
evolution	   between	  environmental	   conditions	   and	  mental	   responses.	   The	  way	   in	  which	   Jesse	   Prinz	  
has	  applied	  this	  view	  of	  perception	  to	  the	  emotions	  has	  attracted	  a	  lot	  of	  attention.13	  Alternatively,	  
the	   issues	   raised	   provide	   the	   incentive	   to	   look	   for	   other	   theoretical	   options.	   Two	   very	   general	  
strategies	  suggest	  themselves.	  One	  may	  first	   look	  for	  alternative	  ways	  of	  understanding	  the	  sort	  of	  
evaluation	  that	  the	  emotions	  consist	  in	  or	  incorporate.	  Instead	  of	  trying	  to	  assimilate	  them	  to	  more	  
familiar	   types	   of	   mental	   states	   like	   judgements,	   thoughts	   or	   perceptions,	   it	   may	   be	   insisted	   that	  
emotions	  are	  sui	  generis	  types	  of	  evaluation:	  perhaps,	  as	  has	  been	  recently	  claimed,	  distinct	  types	  of	  
attitudes.53,56	   If	   so,	   we	   should	   definitively	   try	   to	   say	   more	   about	   what	   they	   are,	   since	   we	   seem	  
otherwise	   to	  be	  back	  at	  our	  starting	  point.	  Second,	  one	  may	  think	   that	   the	  problems	   faced	  by	   the	  
approaches	   discussed	   in	   the	   foregoing	   all	   stem	   from	   the	   idea	   that	   emotions	   are	   evaluations,	   and	  
should	   for	   that	   reason	   lead	   us	   to	   reconsider	   it.	   This	  may	   provide	   the	   incentive	   to	   return	   to	  more	  
traditional	  approaches	   that	  emphasize	   the	   feeling	  dimension	  of	  emotions.31,32,57	  Still,	   capturing	   the	  
distinctive	  sort	  of	  evaluative	   intentionality	   involved	   in	  emotions,	  although	   it	   remains	  disputed	  that	  
there	   is	   one,	   is	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   contemporary	   philosophical	   debates	   regarding	   the	   nature	   of	  
emotion58.	  
	  
EPISTEMOLOGY	  AND	  UNDERSTANDING	  
So	  far,	  we	  have	  been	  concerned	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  emotions	  (“What	  are	  they?”).	  We	  shall	  turn	  our	  
attention	   to	   epistemological	   issues	   surrounding	   them	   (“How	   do	   they	   contribute	   to	   knowledge?”).	  
We	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   that	  we	   should	   not	   account	   for	   the	   nature	   of	   emotions	   by	  
	  	  
identifying	   them	  with	   evaluative	   judgements.	   That	   being	   said,	   emotions	   clearly	   often	   give	   rise	   to	  
evaluative	  judgements	  –	  your	  enjoyment	  of	  the	  movie	  may	  lead	  you	  to	  judge	  that	  is	  was	  good,	  and	  
your	  anger	  at	  your	  boss	  may	  lead	  you	  to	  think	  of	  her	  as	  a	  disrespectful	  person.	  This	  is	  not	  in	  dispute.	  
What	   is	   much	   disputed	   is	   whether	   emotions	   can	   do	   more	   than	   just	   causally	   bring	   about	   these	  
judgements.	   We	   may	   wonder,	   first,	   whether	   emotions	   play	   a	   role	   in	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	  
evaluative	  aspect	  of	  these	  judgements,	   i.e.	   in	  our	  mastery	  of	  the	  evaluative	  concepts	  they	  contain.	  
Second,	   we	  may	   wonder	   whether	   they	   can	   serve	   as	   reasons	   or	   evidence	   or	   justification	   for	   such	  
judgements.	  If	  the	  answer	  to	  any	  of	  these	  questions	  is	  positive,	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  emotions	  play	  
a	   significant	   role	   in	   our	   capacity	   to	   gain	   evaluative	   knowledge.	   Exploring	  whether	   this	   is	   the	   case	  
allows	  revisiting	  some	  of	  the	  approaches	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  emotions	  we	  have	  presented	  above.	  
The	   possibility	   of	   asking	   any	   of	   the	   above	   questions	   about	   the	   relations	   between	   emotions	   and	  
evaluative	   judgements	  does	  not	  even	  arise	   if	  one	   identifies	  the	  former	  with	  the	   latter.	   If	  emotions	  
themselves	   already	   require	   that	   one	   deploys	   the	   relevant	   evaluative	   concepts,	   then	   one	   is	   left	  
wondering	   how	   these	   have	   been	   acquired	   and,	   more	   generally,	   what	   sort	   of	   understanding	   the	  
subject	  has	  of	  them	  and	  under	  which	  circumstances	  they	  are	  justified.	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  acknowledge	  
two	  of	  the	  great	  selling	  points	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  emotions	  are	  perceptions	  of	  evaluative	  properties.	  	  
First,	   regarding	  the	  meaning	  or	  understanding	  of	  evaluative	  concepts,	   the	  perceptual	  model	   is	   in	  a	  
position	   to	   draw	   an	   illuminating	   parallel.	   In	   the	   same	  way	   as	   a	   person	   born	   blind	   will	   lack	   some	  
central	   ingredient	   of	  what	   it	  means	   for	   something	   to	   be	   rightly	   described	   as	   being	   of	   this	   or	   that	  
colour,	   a	   person	   devoid	   of	   any	   emotional	   repertoire	   will	   lack	   some	   central	   ingredient	   of	   what	   it	  
means	  for	  something	  to	  be	  described	  as	  of	  this	  or	  that	  value.	  Perhaps	  this	  truth	  is	  even	  more	  blatant	  
in	   the	  case	  of	  emotions:	  what	  concept	  of	   the	  amusing	  or	   the	  admirable	  could	  be	  had	  by	  someone	  
incapable	  of	  feeling	  any	  kind	  of	  amusement	  or	  admiration?53,59	  	  
Second,	   regarding	   the	   question	   of	   the	   potential	   justificatory	   role	   that	   emotions	   have	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  
relevant	   evaluative	   judgements,	   the	   perceptual	   analogy	   is	   also	   very	   promising.45,50,60	   When	   a	  
perceptual	  state	  presents	  an	  object	  as	  having	  a	  certain	  property,	  this	  seems	  to	  constitute	  a	  reason	  
for	   judging	   that	   this	  object	  has	   that	  property,	  perhaps	  even	   to	   justify	   that	   judgement	  provided	  no	  
evidence	   to	   the	   contrary	   is	   forthcoming.	   The	   same	   may	   be	   said	   of	   emotions:	   when	   an	   emotion	  
presents	  an	  object	  as	  having	  a	  certain	  evaluative	  property,	  this	  seems	  equally	  to	  constitute	  a	  reason	  
for	   judging	   that	   this	   object	   has	   that	   property,	   perhaps	   even	   to	   justify	   that	   evaluative	   judgement	  
provided	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   to	   the	   contrary	   (e.g.	   one	   is	   not	   on	   drugs,	   not	   biased,	   not	   in	   a	  
completely	  foreign	  social	  environment	  or,	  more	  generally,	  not	  affectively	  imbalanced,	  etc.).	  If	  this	  is	  
along	   the	   right	   track,	   the	  perceptual	  model	   can	  pride	   itself	   in	   having	   found	  a	  plausible	   source	   for	  
both	  our	  understanding	  of	  evaluative	  concepts	  and	  our	  knowledge	  about	  them.	  	  
	  	  
While	   this	   is	   indeed	  quite	  plausible,	   some	  questions	  must	   still	  be	  answered.	   It	   is	   after	  all	   a	   truism	  
that	  emotions	  can	  lead	  us	  astray	  and	  that	  the	  judgements	  they	  prompt	  us	  to	  make	  in	  the	  heat	  of	  the	  
moment	  are	  often	  of	  a	  dubious	  epistemic	   standing.55,61,62	  Emotions	  are	  perhaps	  not	   to	  be	   trusted,	  
and	   their	   reliability	   cannot	   be	   taken	   for	   granted	   in	   the	   way	   the	   reliability	   of	   perception	   can	   be.	  
Observe	  how	  this	  fact	  is	  mirrored	  in	  the	  sorts	  of	  questions	  we	  readily	  ask	  about	  people’s	  emotions	  as	  
opposed	  to	  people’s	  perceptual	  experiences.63	  If	  someone	  refers	  to	  Marie	  having	  seen	  the	  pony	  car	  
in	  the	  parking	  lot	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  why	  Marie	  has	  judged	  that	  the	  pony	  car	  was	  parked	  there,	  this	  
explanation	  is	  satisfactory	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  think	  of	  such	  perceptual	  states	  not	  only	  as	  reasons	  
for	  such	  kinds	  of	  judgements,	  but	  also	  as	  natural	  end	  points	  in	  the	  search	  for	  epistemic	  explanations.	  
By	  contrast,	  suppose	  that	  you	  are	  asked	  why	  you	  judged	  a	  person’s	  action	  to	  be	  unfair	  and	  that	  you	  
respond	  by	  mentioning	  your	  indignation	  at	  the	  action.	  Citing	  this	  emotion	  may	  go	  some	  way	  towards	  
providing	  a	  reason	  for	  the	  judgement,	  but	   it	  certainly	  cannot	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  natural	  end	  point	   in	  the	  
search	  for	  epistemic	  explanations.	  For	  it	  would	  be	  natural	  to	  continue	  questioning	  the	  person:	  “Yes,	  
but	  why	  such	  indignation?”.	  We	  would	  then	  expect	  the	  person	  to	  make	  reference	  to	  some	  features	  
of	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  light	  of	  which	  the	  unfairness	  is	  made	  manifest	  or	  at	  least	  intelligible.53	  On	  this	  
basis,	   one	   may	   be	   led	   to	   think	   that	   the	   epistemological	   role	   of	   emotions	   differs	   from	   that	   of	  
perceptions.	   Emotions	   constitute	   reasons	   for	   evaluative	   judgements,	   but	   they	   also	   respond	   to	  
reasons	   and	   are	   themselves	   capable	   of	   being	   justified	   or	   unjustified.	   Perceptions,	   however,	  
constitute	   reasons,	   but	   do	   not	   in	   addition	   respond	   to	   reasons	   and	   are	   not	   themselves	   capable	   of	  
being	  justified	  or	  unjustified	  in	  this	  way.	  
The	  fact	  that	  emotions	  respond	  to	  reasons	  appears	  to	  be	  intimately	  related	  to	  the	  fact,	  emphasized	  
in	  the	  previous	  section,	  that	  they	  fundamentally	  depend	  on	  other	  mental	  states.65	  Recall	  that	  what	  
the	   emotions	   are	   about	   is	   always	   accessed	   through	   other	   mental	   states	   (perceptions,	   beliefs,	  
memories,	  etc.).	  We	  may	   indeed	  think	  that	   the	  sorts	  of	   reasons	  to	  which	  emotions	  are	  responsive	  
are	  at	   least	  partly	  provided	  by	  the	  content	  of	  the	  mental	  states	  on	  which	  they	  depend.	  The	  above	  
question,	  “Why	  such	  indignation?”,	  is	  at	  least	  partly	  answered	  by	  mentioning,	  say,	  that	  one	  has	  seen	  
the	  person	  being	  subject	  to	  a	  humiliating	  physical	  treatment.	  In	  addition,	  observe	  that	  a	  further	  part	  
of	   the	   answer	   is	   provided	   by	   another	   source	   of	   what	   looks	   like	   reasons	   for	   emotions	   and	   the	  
judgements	   they	   give	   rise	   to,	   namely	   the	   variety	   of	   emotional	   dispositions	   (cares,	   concerns,	  
sentiments,	   character	   traits,	   etc.)	   of	  which	  emotions	   are	  manifestations	   as	  well	   as	   conative	   states	  
such	   as	   desires	   and	  wishes.63	   An	   episode	   of	   indignation	  may	   thus	   be	   explained	   by	   one’s	   care	   for	  
social	   justice.	  More	  generally,	  our	  emotional	  responses	  are	  very	  commonly	  made	  intelligible	   in	  the	  
light	  of	  the	  particular	  sentiments,	  concerns	  or	  attachments	  that	  relate	  us	  to	  people,	   institutions	  or	  
other	  objects.	  
	  	  
Amongst	  the	  issues	  raised	  by	  the	  foregoing	  observations	  about	  the	  epistemological	  role	  of	  emotions,	  
the	   following	  are	  especially	  pressing.	  First,	  what	   is	   the	  exact	   role	  played	  by	  emotional	  dispositions	  
(cares,	  concerns,	  sentiments,	  etc.)	  or	  conative	  states	  (desires,	  wishes)	  with	  respect	  to	  emotions?	  Do	  
they	  merely	  explain	  causally	  why	  emotions	  occur,	  or	  do	  they	  provide	  distinctive	  justifying	  reasons	  for	  
them?	  Could	  my	  enmity	  for	  my	  boss	  justifies	  my	  being	  angry	  at	  what	  she	  now	  tells	  me?	  The	  issue	  is	  
made	  especially	  difficult	  as	   the	  answer	  seems	  to	  depend	  on	  one’s	  conception	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  
evaluative	  properties	   to	  which	  emotions	  allegedly	   respond.53	  Suppose	   that	   the	  offensive	  nature	  of	  
one’s	  boss’	  remark	  entirely	  depends	  on	  one’s	  enmity	  for	  her	  or	  more	  generally	  on	  one’s	  wish	  for	  not	  
being	  the	  target	  of	  such	  remarks.	  If	  so,	  then	  of	  course	  mention	  of	  the	  disposition	  or	  the	  wish	  will	  go	  
quite	  a	  long	  way	  towards	  justifying	  the	  episode	  of	  anger	  they	  elicit.	  This	   is	  because	  they	  will	  partly	  
constitute	   the	   remark’s	   offensiveness.	   By	   contrast,	   if	   the	   evaluative	   properties	   at	   stake	   are	  more	  
independent	  from	  emotional	  dispositions	  and	  conative	  states,	  as	  some	  realists	  would	  have	   it,	   then	  
we	   should	   carefully	  distinguish	   their	   causal	   contribution	   to	   the	  occurrence	  of	  emotions	   from	   their	  
potential	   contribution	   to	   their	   justification.	   Second,	   if	   evaluative	   properties	   prove	   to	   be	   relatively	  
independent	  from	  emotional	  dispositions	  and	  the	  like,	  then	  important	  issues	  arise	  as	  to	  whether	  and	  
to	   what	   extent	   these	   psychological	   conditions	   distort	   one’s	   appreciation	   of	   the	   evaluative	  
landscape.63	  If	  emotions	  are	  to	  be	  a	  sort	  of	  mechanism	  for	  detecting	  evaluative	  properties,	  it	  better	  
be	  the	  case	  that	  they	  reach	  a	  level	  of	  reliability	  compatible	  with	  such	  a	  status.	  Third,	   if	  as	  we	  have	  
suggested	   emotions	   are	   themselves	   capable	   of	   being	   justified	   or	   unjustified,	   can	   they	   still	   play	   a	  
justificatory	  role	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  evaluative	  judgements	  they	  elicit?	  Or	  are	  the	  reasons	  that	  justify	  these	  
emotions	  also	  and	  uniquely	  responsible	  for	  the	  justification	  of	  these	  evaluative	  judgements?	  	  
Two	   very	   different	   pictures	   suggest	   themselves	   here.53	   According	   to	   one	   of	   them,	   emotions	   are	  
superfluous	   routes	   to	   judgements	   because	   these	   judgements	   may	   have	   the	   same	   epistemic	  
credentials	   independently	   of	   emotions.	   If	   there	   are	   reasons	   to	   judge	   that	   one’s	   boss’	   remark	   is	  
offensive,	   these	   reasons	   support	   the	   relevant	   judgement	   irrespective	   of	  whether	   they	   in	   addition	  
elicit	  an	  emotional	  reaction.61	  According	  to	  the	  other	  picture,	  emotions	  play	  a	  non-­‐eliminable	  role	  in	  
transmitting	  reasons	  to	  evaluative	  judgements.	  This	  role	  may	  consist,	  first,	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  emotions	  
lock	  attention	  to	  features	  of	  the	  environment	  one	  would	  have	  missed	  but	  for	  their	  occurrence,28,65	  
and	  maintain	  attentional	   focus	  on	   them	   in	   such	  a	  way	   that	  one	   is	   in	  a	  good	  epistemic	  position	   to	  
make	   the	   relevant	   evaluative	   judgements.	   The	   second	   sense	   in	  which	   emotions	   constitute	   a	   non-­‐
eliminable	  way	  of	  transmitting	  reasons	  to	  judgements	  of	  value	  is	  that	  of	  contributing	  essentially	  to	  
one’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   evaluative	   dimension	   of	   these	   judgements,	   an	   idea	   we	   have	   already	  
mentioned	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  acquisition	  of	  evaluative	  concepts.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  is	  might	  well	  
be	  that	  emotions	  are	  indispensable	  to	  acquire	  knowledge	  of	  value.	  
	  	  
	  
NATURE	  VS.	  NURTURE	  
We	  have	  started	  this	  overview	  trying	  to	  distinguish	  emotions	  from	  other	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  affective	  
realm.	  We	  have	  observed	  that	  we	  may	  distinguish	  different	  types	  of	  emotions	  according	  to	  the	  type	  
of	  evaluation	  they	  respectively	  make.	  We	  shall	  now	  see	  that	  there	  are	  broader	  structural	  distinctions	  
to	  be	  drawn	  within	  the	  emotional	  domain.	  The	  central	  question	  in	  this	  area	  regards	  the	  existence	  of	  
a	  division	  between	  emotions	   that	  are	   relatively	   impervious	   to	   contextual	   influences	   and	  emotions	  
that	  are	  very	  much	  permeable	  to	  such	  influences.	  
One	  way	  of	  addressing	  this	  question	  is	  through	  the	  very	  intuitive	  distinction	  between	  emotions	  that	  
look	   relatively	   simple	  or	  basic	   (fear,	  anger	  and	   joy)	  and	  emotions	   that	   look	  more	  complex	   (regret,	  
pride,	  nostalgia).	  While	  this	  is	  a	  very	  ancient	  distinction,	  psychologists	  nowadays	  pursue	  this	  insight	  
by	   trying	   to	   find	   out	   which	   emotions	   have	   distinctive	   biological	   signatures,	   be	   they	   discoverable	  
through	   the	   relevant	   facial	   expressions,	   brain	   circuits,	   evolutionary	   function,	   motivational	   role	   or	  
patterns	   of	   physiological	   activation.66-­‐68	   The	   viability	   of	   this	   project	   can	   be	   put	   into	   question.69	  
However,	   those	  who	   find	   it	   convincing	   that	   some	  parts	  of	   the	  emotional	  domain	  are	   in	   this	   sense	  
primary	   have	   interesting	   resources	   at	   their	   disposal	   to	   articulate	   the	   relations	   between	   the	  
emotionally	  basic	  and	  the	  emotionally	  more	  complex.	  	  
While	   there	   are	   different	   ways	   to	   go	   about	   articulating	   these	   relations,	   the	   following	   one,	   nicely	  
developed	  in	  Jesse	  Prinz,13,70	  proves	  especially	  attractive.	  Drawing	  from	  the	  distinctions	  we	  made	  in	  
the	   foregoing	   between	   the	   kind	   of	   evaluation	   that	   an	   emotion	   type	   involves	   and	   the	   variety	   of	  
objects	  that	  it	  can	  take,	  we	  can	  be	  led	  to	  think	  that	  some	  types	  of	  complex	  emotions	  result	  from	  a	  
particular	   inflection	   of	   a	   more	   basic	   type	   of	   emotions.	   Indignation	   is	   a	   type	   of	   anger:	   both	  
indignation	   and	   anger	   evaluate	   in	   terms	   of	   offensiveness,	   but	   the	   former	   focuses	   on	   one	   type	   of	  
offensive	  objects,	  i.e.	  immoral	  actions	  of	  others.	  Likewise,	  Schadenfreude	  and	  the	  Japanese	  emotion	  
ijirashii	   are	   types	   of	   joy	   that	   are	   exclusively	   focused	   on	   two	   subsets	   of	   what	   may	   elicit	   joy:	   the	  
misfortunes	   and	   the	   accomplishments	   of	   others,	   respectively.	   If	   so,	   then	   cultural	   influences	   on	  
emotions	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  harnessing	  our	  basic	  emotional	   repertoire	  and	  channelling	   it	   in	  
directions	  that	  are	  considered	  of	  special	   import	  within	  the	  relevant	  culture.	  Such	  an	  approach	  is	   in	  
the	   interesting	   position	   to	   account	   for	   important	   cultural	   variations	   in	   the	   emotions	   (including	  
significant	  differences	  regarding	  how	  prevalent	  an	  emotion	  is),	  while	  preserving	  intact	  the	  idea	  that	  
human	  emotional	  lives	  build	  on	  a	  set	  of	  universally	  shared	  emotional	  capacities.	  
This	  may	  constitute	  too	  superficial	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  the	  social	  forces	  exerted	  on	  the	  
emotions,	   however.	   Consider	   for	   instance	   the	   great	   variety	   of	   ways	   in	   which	   emotions	   find	  
	  	  
expression	   in	  different	  social,	  cultural	  and	  historical	  contexts.	  Contrast	  how	  pride	   is	  expressed	   in	  a	  
competitive,	  achievement-­‐oriented	  society	  with	  the	  way	  it	  was	  stigmatized	  and	  hence	  repressed	  in	  
the	  medieval	  Christian	  world.	  Or	  think	  of	  the	  momentous	  differences	  in	  the	  ways	  grief	  is	  expressed	  
in	   Iran	  and	   in	   Switzerland.	  How	  emotions	  get	  expressed	   in	  different	   settings,	   it	  might	  be	   thought,	  
contributes	  essentially	  to	  the	  very	  identity	  of	  the	  emotions	  one	  feels.	  From	  these	  observations,	  it	  is	  
perhaps	  a	  small	  step	  to	  the	  claim	  that,	  in	  shaping	  the	  way	  emotions	  are	  expressed,	  a	  subject	  or	  the	  
group	   to	   which	   she	   belongs	   do	   not	   merely	   channel	   the	   natural	   manifestations	   of	   biologically	  
determined	  responses	  in	  specific	  directions.	  They	  more	  fundamentally	  contribute	  to	  fixing	  the	  very	  
nature	  of	  the	  emotions.	  Grist	  is	  brought	  to	  the	  same	  mill	  when	  we	  recognize	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
communicative	  function	  of	  emotional	  display,71,72	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  consciously	  bent	  to	  
serve	  a	  variety	  of	  personal	  or	  communal	  ends.66	  Emotions	  would	  thus	  be	  more	  profitably	  understood	  
in	  light	  of	  the	  ends	  we	  pursue	  in	  shaping	  them	  than	  as	  given	  biological	  building	  blocks.	  
These	  thoughts	  fit	  naturally	  within	  a	  tradition	  according	  to	  which	  emotions,	  considered	  at	  whatever	  
level	  we	  care	  to	  look	  at	  (brain,	  physiology,	  phenomenology),	  fail	  to	  have	  any	  distinctive	  profile.17,73,76	  
If	  that	  is	  the	  case	  (i.e.	  if	  the	  responses	  underdetermine	  the	  specific	  type	  of	  emotion	  the	  subject	  may	  
be	  experiencing)	  then	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  subject	  herself	  or	  perhaps	  even	  to	  members	  of	  her	  community	  
to	   determine	   which	   it	   is.	   And,	   obviously,	   the	   response	   itself	   won’t	   exert	   much	   pressure	   on	   the	  
direction	   this	   determination	   process	   takes.	   According	   to	   this	   form	   of	   constructionism	   about	  
emotions,	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  subject	  or	  members	  of	  her	  community	  to	  determine	  which	  emotion	  is	  taking	  
place	  by	  interpreting	  a	  response	  largely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  relevant	  and/or	  salient	  cultural	  norms	  as	  well	  
as	   of	   contextual	   features	   of	   the	   situation	   in	  which	   the	   emotion	   takes	   place.75-­‐77	   For	   example,	   the	  
negative	   and	   high-­‐arousal	   emotional	   response	   one	   has	   when	   witnessing	   someone	   courting	   one’s	  
partner	  may	  be	  constituted	  into	  an	  episode	  of	  righteous	  indignation	  in	  one	  cultural	  context,	  and	  into	  
one	  of	  pathetic	  jealousy	  in	  another.	  Now,	  if	  this	  is	  true,	  observe	  that	  determining	  which	  emotions	  we	  
feel	   is	   not	   a	   matter	   of	   being	   more	   attentive	   to	   what	   goes	   on	   within	   us,	   but	   rather	   a	   matter	   of	  
subsuming	  whatever	  we	  feel	  under	  the	  relevant	  personal	  or	  communal	  norms.	  	  
Does	   the	   evidence	   force	   us	   to	   adopt	   such	   a	   far-­‐reaching	   form	   of	   constructionism	   about	   the	  
emotions?	  Or	  can	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  our	  emotional	  life	  lends	  itself	  to	  social	  influences	  –	  in	  
particular	   the	   social	   dimension	   of	   the	   emotions’	   triggers	   as	  well	   as	   that	   of	   their	   expressions	   –	   be	  
addressed	   within	   a	   framework	   that	   acknowledges	   the	   universal	   and	   innate	   character	   of	   at	   least	  
some	  of	  our	  emotions?	  The	  tension	  between	  these	  two	  poles	  structures	  much	  of	  the	  recent	  debates	  
in	  the	  area78.	  
EMOTIONS	  AND	  ACTION	  
	  	  
It	  is	  often	  taken	  for	  granted	  that	  emotions	  move	  us	  to	  action.	  The	  term	  ‘emotion’,	  which	  comes	  from	  
the	  Latin	  ex,	  which	  means	  out,	  and	  movere,	  which	  means	   to	  move,	   suggests	   that	  emotions	   tightly	  
related	  to	  motivation.	  In	  any	  case,	  anger	  is	  often	  thought	  to	  come	  with	  aggressive	  behaviour,	  while	  
fear	  is	  commonly	  related	  to	  specific	  responses	  such	  as	  flight.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  
emotions	   and	   motivation	   is	   a	   central	   question	   in	   emotion	   research.	   There	   are	   many	   ways	   to	  
conceive	  of	  the	  relation,	  but	  the	  most	  central	   from	  a	  philosophical	  point	  of	  view	  is	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  
essential	  nature	  of	  emotions.	  Is	  there	  an	  essential	  relation	  between	  emotions	  and	  motivation,	  or	  at	  
least	   between	   emotions	   such	   as	   anger	   and	   fear	   and	  motivation?	   If	   so,	   one	   could	   not	   undergo	   an	  
emotion	  like	  anger	  without	  being	  motivated	  to	  aggressive	  behaviour.	  In	  fact,	  it	  might	  be	  tempting	  to	  
hold	   the	   even	   stronger	   thesis	   that	   the	   very	   concept	   of	   emotion	   is	   one	   of	   a	   state	   that	   involves	  
motivation.	  Putative	   cases	  of	  emotion	   lacking	  any	  motivational	   component	  would	  be	   ruled	  out	  by	  
definition.	  
To	  address	  the	  question	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  emotion	  and	  motivation,	  one	  first	  has	  to	  reflect	  on	  
the	   nature	   of	   the	  motivation	   at	   issue.	   It	   is	   generally	   agreed	   that	   emotions	   such	   as	   anger	   or	   fear	  
facilitate	  action,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  bodily	  changes	  prepare	  us	  for	  action	  and	  increase	  the	  probability	  
of	   certain	   type	  of	   actions,	   such	   as	   revenge	  when	  we	   are	   angry,	   or	   flight	  when	  we	   are	   afraid.	   The	  
hedonic	  tones	  of	  emotions	  are	  also	  plausibly	  taken	  to	  have	  a	  motivational	  effect.	  But	  the	  question	  is	  
whether	  the	  motivations	  involved	  in	  emotion	  are	  specific	  behavioural	  dispositions	  that	  feed	  directly	  
into	   the	   motor	   system,	   or	   whether	   they	   are	   states,	   such	   as	   desires,	   that	   only	   have	   an	   indirect	  
influence	  on	  what	  we	  do.	  
According	   to	   the	   first	   approach,	   an	   emotion	   like	   anger	   or	   fear	   comes	   with	   rigid	   behavioural	  
dispositions	   to	   perform	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   actions.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   anger,	   these	   are	   the	   kinds	   of	  
behaviour	  we	  associate	  with	  aggression	  and	  revenge,	  such	  as	  menace,	  attack	  and	  fight,	  while	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  fear,	  the	  pieces	  of	  behaviour	  standardly	  referred	  to	  are	  flight,	  freeze	  and	  fight.73,79-­‐80	  These	  
dispositions	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  triggered	  by	  a	  narrow	  range	  of	  stimuli,	  such	  as	  the	  sight	  of	  a	  competitor	  
or	   a	   predator,	   and	   are	   thought	   to	   be	   characterised	  by	   rapid	   and	   automatic	  manifestations,	  which	  
occur	  independently	  of	  thought	  and	  decision.66,79-­‐81	  
The	  thesis	  that	  emotions	  involve	  behavioural	  dispositions	  is	  plausible	  in	  the	  case	  of	  most	  non-­‐human	  
emotions.82	   However,	   even	   if	   human	   beings	   occasionally	  manifest	   the	   same	   kind	   of	   behaviour	   as	  
frightened	  squirrels	  and	  marmots,	   it	   is	  obvious	   that	  what	  human	  beings	  do	  when	   they	  experience	  
anger	  or	  fear	  is	  much	  more	  varied.	  Anger	  might	  make	  you	  shout	  and	  hit	  the	  table	  with	  your	  fist,	  but	  
it	  might	  also	  get	  you	  to	  talk	  with	  your	  lawyer.	  Panic	  might	  make	  you	  run	  out	  of	  a	  building	  on	  fire,	  but	  
	  	  
it	   can	   also	   get	   you	   to	   call	   for	   help	   on	   your	   cell-­‐phone.	   This	   is	   why	   many	   have	   thought	   that	   the	  
relation	  between	  fear	  and	  action	  is	  an	  indirect	  one.	  
On	  this	  alternative	  approach,	  emotions	  are	  taken	  to	  involve	  states,	  such	  as	  motives	  or	  desires,	  which	  
have	  an	  indirect	  influence	  on	  action.	  They	  influence	  the	  agent’s	  decision	  process	  by	  setting	  specific	  
goals.13,83,84	  Following	  Aristotle,	  anger	  has	  been	  taken	  to	   involve	  a	  desire	   for	   revenge	  (Ref	  85,	   II,	  2,	  
1378b)85.	  Fear,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  often	  thought	  to	  involve	  the	  desire	  to	  avoid	  harm	  or	  loss.	  These	  
desires	   inform	   the	   agent’s	   decision	   process	   and	   result	   in	   action	   only	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   decision	  
process.	  Given	  your	  other	  goals,	  and	  given	  what	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  feasible,	  the	  desires	  in	  question	  might	  
well	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  what	  you	  do.	  You	  might	  be	  angry	  at	  whoever	  stole	  your	  bicycle	  but	  since	  you	  
fail	  to	  know	  who	  it	   is,	  no	  revenge	  follows.	  This	   is	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  the	  motivational	   impact	  of	  
emotions,	   but	   the	   question	   arises	   as	   to	   how	   to	   interpret	   it.	   Should	  we	   take	   it	   that	   emotions	   like	  
anger	  or	  fear,	  or	  maybe	  all	  emotions,	  are	  essentially	  tied	  to	  desires?	  Or	  is	  the	  relation	  a	  weaker	  one?	  	  	  
A	  first	  family	  of	  cases	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  square	  with	  this	  conception	  are	  emotions	  that	  involve	  so-­‐
called	  ‘expressive	  actions’.86-­‐88	  Consider	  Jane,	  who	  out	  of	  hatred	  gouges	  holes	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  her	  rival	  
on	  a	  photograph.	  It	   is	  plausible	  to	  assume	  that	  Jane’s	  hatred	  involves	  a	  desire	  that	  sets	  the	  goal	  of	  
harming	  that	  person.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  desire	  in	  question	  would	  fail	  to	  explain	  what	  Jane	  does,	  
given	  the	  assumption	  that	  she	  does	  not	  hold	  that	  harming	  a	  photograph	  does	  real	  harm.	  According	  
to	   Peter	   Goldie’s	   plausible	   suggestion,	   expressive	   actions	   such	   as	   Jane’s	   are	   explained	   by	  wishes,	  
understood	  as	  conative	  states	  which	  involve	  imagining	  that	  one	  satisfies	  a	  desire.3	  What	  Jane	  desires	  
is	  to	  scratch	  out	  her	  rival’s	  eyes,	  but	  since	  that	  is	  out	  of	  question,	  she	  scratches	  out	  the	  eyes	  in	  the	  
photograph	  imagining	  that	  by	  harming	  the	  photograph,	  she	  achieves	  her	  goal.	  Alternatively,	  it	  might	  
be	  argued	  that	  Jane’s	  action	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  misfiring	  of	  a	  primitive	  disposition	  to	  
harm	  that	  is	  often	  present	  in	  hate.	  Given	  the	  visual	  similarity	  between	  the	  photograph	  and	  the	  real	  
person,	   the	   primitive	   disposition	   to	   harm	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   triggered	   as	  much	   by	   the	   photograph	   of	  
someone	  as	  by	  the	  real	  person.	  
Another	   family	  of	   problematic	   cases	   are	  emotions	  directed	  at	   fiction.	  We	  often	   feel	   anger	  or	   fear	  
when	   reading	   a	   novel	   or	   watching	   a	   film.	   These	   emotions	   appear	   to	   have	   a	   tenuous	   link	   to	  
motivation.	  For	  instance,	  as	  Kendall	  Walton	  observed,	  you	  might	  shriek	  and	  clutch	  your	  chair	  when	  
you	  watch	  a	  film	  in	  which	  a	  green	  slime	  oozes	  over	  the	  earth,	  destroying	  everything	  on	  its	  path,	  but	  
you	  don’t	  run	  out	  of	  the	  theatre	  or	  call	  911	  for	  help.89	  According	  to	  some,	  such	  as	  Walton	  himself,	  
such	  cases	  do	  not	   involve	  genuine	  emotions,	  but	  only	   ‘quasi-­‐emotions’.	  However,	   it	  might	  well	  be	  
that	  such	  emotions	  are	  genuine	  ones	  even	   if	   they	   fail	   to	   involve	   the	   typical	  desires	  and	  evaluative	  
	  	  
judgements	   found	   in	   real-­‐life	   cases.82,90	   If	   this	   is	   correct,	   even	   an	   emotion	   like	   fear	  would	   not	   be	  
essentially	  related	  to	  a	  motivation.	  
Similar	  difficulties	  arise	  from	  emotions	  that	  are	  directed	  at	  the	  past.	  You	  can	  surely	  be	  angry	  at	  an	  
ancestor	   who	   lost	   the	   family	   estate	   by	   gambling,	   but	   even	   though	   such	   anger	  might	   involve	   the	  
desire	   to	   get	   back	   at	   your	   ancestor	   as	   well	   as	   expressive	   action,	   it	   is	   far	   from	   clear	   that	   anger	  
directed	  at	  the	  past	  needs	  to	  do	  so.	  Moreover,	  there	  are	  kinds	  of	  emotions	  that	  are	   less	  obviously	  
connected	  to	  motivation,	  such	  as	  admiration,	  joy,	  relief,	  and	  awe.	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  you	  can	  admire	  
a	   landscape	   without	   having	   any	   particular	   desire	   or	   wish	   regarding	   the	   landscape.	   So,	   even	   if	  
emotions	   such	   as	   anger	   and	   fear	   appear	   standardly	   tied	   to	   desires	   and	   thus	   to	   action,	   it	   is	   not	  
obvious	  that	  this	  is	  part	  of	  their	  essence.	  And	  more	  generally,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  
essence	   of	   emotions	   in	   general	   that	   they	   involve	  motivation.	   Thus,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   the	   ordinary	  
concept	   of	   emotion	   is	   such	   as	   to	   exclude	   cases	   in	  which	   there	   is	   no	  motivation.	   Still,	   it	   has	   to	   be	  
acknowledged	  that	  many	  emotions	  standardly	  come	  with	  both	  behavioural	  dispositions	  and	  specific	  
desires.	  This	  is	  the	  main	  reason	  why	  emotions	  have	  been	  a	  central	  topic	  in	  ethics.	  
EMOTIONS	  AND	  ETHICS	  
With	  only	  the	  slightest	  exaggeration,	  the	  philosophical	  community	  might	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  divided	  into	  
two	  opposite	  camps.	  On	  the	  one	  side,	  we	  have	  the	  rationalists,	  who	  put	  their	  trust	  in	  the	  faculty	  of	  
reason,	  and	  find	  fault	  with	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  emotions.	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  we	  have	  the	  sentimentalists,	  
who	  often	  combine	  a	  suspicion	  of	  the	  power	  of	  reason	  with	  various	  claims	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  
emotions	   in	   our	   lives.	   Rationalists	   consider	  most	   emotions	   to	   be	   a	   threat	   to	   rationality,	   whether	  
theoretical	  or	  practical.	  Episodes	  of	  anger,	  envy	  and	  fear	  have	  thus	  been	  accused	  of	  interfering	  with	  
proper	  reasoning,	  of	  favouring	  irrational	  and	  imprudent	  behaviour,	  and	  of	  eliciting	  immoral	  actions	  
(Ref	  33,	  bk.	  viii).33	  Sentimentalists,	  however,	  hold	  that	  far	  from	  constituting	  an	  obstacle	  to	  rationality	  
and	  morality,	  emotions	  are	  both	  crucial	   to	   the	  proper	   functioning	  of	   reason,	  and	  essential	   to	  pro-­‐
social	   and	   moral	   action.	   Following	   the	   work	   of	   Ronald	   de	   Sousa28	   and	   Antonio	   Damasio91,	   most	  
contemporary	  emotion	  theorists	  have	  adopted	  the	  sentimentalist	  stance.92	  
The	  debate	  between	  rationalists	  and	  sentimentalists	  is	  far	  from	  settled.	  This	  is	  particularly	  striking	  in	  
ethics,	   where	   the	   opposition	   between	   moral	   rationalism	   and	   moral	   sentimentalism	   continues	   to	  
define	  the	  battleground.	  Moral	  rationalism,	  which	   is	  often	  traced	  back	  to	   Immanuel	  Kant93,	  can	  be	  
characterised,	  very	  roughly,	  as	  the	  claim	  that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  grounded	  in	  reason.	  By	  contrast,	  
moral	  sentimentalism	  not	  only	  denies	  that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  grounded	  in	  reason,	  it	  also	  claims	  
that	  the	  ground	  of	  moral	  judgements	  lies	  in	  our	  sentiments.	  Thus,	  David	  Hume,	  the	  most	  prominent	  
	  	  
moral	  sentimentalist,	  famously	  states	  that	  ‘morality	  [...]	  is	  more	  properly	  felt	  than	  judg’d	  of’	  (Ref	  94,	  
book	  III,	  Part	  I,	  Section	  III)	  and	  explicitly	  argues	  that	  moral	  distinctions	  are	  not	  derived	  from	  reason.	  	  
To	  make	  progress	  in	  this	  debate,	  two	  questions	  need	  to	  be	  settled.	  The	  first	  concerns	  the	  nature	  of	  
emotions.	  It	  is	  only	  if	  emotions	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  entirely	  non-­‐intentional	  states,	  which	  have	  nothing	  to	  
do	  with	  rationality,	  that	  a	  radical	  contrast	  between	  moral	  sentimentalism	  and	  moral	  rationalism	  can	  
be	  upheld	   (see	  section	  2).	  The	  second	  question	  concerns	   the	  exact	   role	  emotions	  are	  supposed	  to	  
play	  in	  our	  ethical	  lives.	  Given	  the	  diversity	  of	  emotion	  types	  –	  think	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  hate,	  
guilt	   and	   compassion,	   for	   instance	   –	   and	   the	   complexity	   of	   each	   particular	   emotion	   episode,	   it	  
should	  not	   come	  as	   a	   surprise	   that	   emotions	  have	  been	   taken	   to	  play	  quite	  different	   roles	   in	   our	  
ethical	  lives.	  Moreover,	  there	  are	  many	  sorts	  of	  entities	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  interesting	  relations	  
to	   emotions.	   For	   instance,	   one	   can	   think	   about	   the	   relation	   between	   emotions	   and	   a)	   moral	  
judgements,	  such	  as	  the	  judgements	  concerning	  what	  agents	  ought	  to	  do	  or	  judgements	  about	  what	  
is	  good	  or	  bad,	  admirable	  or	  despicable,	  etc.,	  b)	  moral	  motivation	  and	  action,	  c)	  moral	  reasoning	  or	  
deliberation	   about	  what	   to	   do,	   d)	  moral	   facts,	   such	   as	   the	   fact	   that	   an	   agent	   ought	   not	   to	   cheat,	  
supposing	   that	   there	   are	   such	   facts,	   as	  well	   as	   e)	   character,	   and	   in	  particular	   virtuous	   and	   vicious	  
traits,	  such	  as	  courage	  and	  cowardice.	  Emotions	  also	  play	  a	  role	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  number	  of	  goods,	  
such	   as	   autonomy47,95,96	   or	   wellbeing.57,97	   Here,	   we	   focus	   on	   the	   role	   of	   emotions	   in	   moral	  
judgements	  and	  in	  moral	  motivation.	  
According	  to	  a	  number	  of	  philosophers,	  moral	   judgements,	  or	  at	   least	  a	  specifiable	  group	  of	  these	  
judgements,	  are	  reducible	  to,	  constituted	  by,	  or	  identical	  with	  emotion.98,99	  Observe	  in	  passing	  that	  
these	  approaches	  represent	  the	  exact	   inversion	  of	   judgemental	   theories	  of	  emotions,	  according	  to	  
which	  emotions	  are	  constituted	  by	  or	   identical	  to	  evaluative	  or	  normative	  judgements	  (see	  section	  
2)).	   This	   option	   has	   been	   attractive	   to	   proponents	   of	  moral	   non-­‐cognitivism,	   the	   view	   that	  moral	  
judgements	  do	  not	  have	  the	  function	  of	  stating	  facts	  and	  thus	  fail	  to	  be	  genuinely	  truth-­‐assessable.	  
As	  a	  view	  about	  judgements,	  moral	  non-­‐cognitivism	  is	  distinct	  from,	  but	  congenial	  to,	  two	  important	  
but	   controversial	   doctrines,	   which	   consider	   emotions	   to	   be	   central	   to	   ethics:	   expressivism	   (or	  
emotivism),	   the	   semantic	   thesis	   that	   the	   function	  of	  moral	   sentences	   is	   to	  express	  emotions,100-­‐102	  
and	  projectivism,	  the	  view	  that	  morality	  per	  se	  is	  a	  projection	  of	  our	  emotions	  onto	  the	  world.103	  	  
In	   general,	   moral	   non-­‐cognitivism,	   as	   well	   as	   emotivism	   and	   projectivism,	   are	   premised	   on	   two	  
assumptions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  emotions:	  first,	  that	  emotions	  lack	  representational	  content,	  which	  
can	   be	   assessable	   in	   terms	   of	   truth	   or	   correctness;	   and,	   second,	   that	   emotions	   are	   essentially	  
motivational	  states,	  so	  that	  by	  establishing	  a	  link	  to	  emotion,	  the	  motivational	  power	  of	  evaluative	  
judgements,	  utterances	  or	  facts	   is	  supposed	  to	  be	  accounted	  for.	  This	  makes	  for	  a	  problem.	  As	  we	  
	  	  
have	  observed	  above,	   the	   recent	   consensus	   in	  emotion	   theory	   is	   that	   there	   is	   ground	   to	  question	  
these	  assumptions	  and	  to	  adopt	  an	  intentional	  account	  of	  emotions,	  such	  as	  the	  judgemental	  or	  the	  
perceptual	  theory.	  
There	   are	   other	   ways	   to	   conceive	   the	   relation	   between	   moral	   judgements	   and	   emotions.	   On	   a	  
promising	  account,	  which	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  Franz	  Brentano,104	  	  moral	  concepts	  can	  be	  analysed	  
in	   terms	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   emotions	   that	   are	   fitting	   or	   appropriate	   to	   their	   object.	   There	   are	  
different	   ways	   to	   spell	   out	   what	   has	   become	   known	   as	   neo-­‐sentimentalism	   or	   fitting	   attitude	  
analyses.	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  the	  claim	  is	  that	  equivalences	  like	  the	  following	  hold	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  concepts	  
that	  are	  involved:	  x	   is	  fearsome	  if	  and	  only	  x	   is	  such	  as	  to	  make	  fear	  appropriate,	  and	  similarly	  x	   is	  
admirable	  if	  and	  only	  if	  x	  is	  such	  as	  to	  make	  admiration	  appropriate.105-­‐107	  In	  order	  to	  spell	  out	  such	  
approaches,	  one	  must	  of	  course	  specify	  what	   it	   is	   for	  emotions	  to	  be	  appropriate.	  This	  has	  proven	  
particularly	  tricky,	  for	  a	  good	  account	  needs	  to	  avoid	  an	  important	  objection,	  which	  emphasises	  that	  
an	  emotion	  such	  as	  admiration	  might	  well	  be	  appropriate	  with	  respect	  to	  something	  that	  is	  far	  from	  
admirable.	  It	  can	  for	  instance	  be	  useful	  to	  admire	  one’s	  rich	  acquaintance’s	  yacht	  if	  one	  wants	  to	  be	  
invited	  on	  board,	   but	   this	   has	   little	   to	  do	  with	   its	   genuine	  admirableness.107,108	   In	   response,	   it	   has	  
been	  argued	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  appropriateness	  at	  stake	  has	  to	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  
the	  correctness	  of	  emotions	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  objects.109,110	  
The	   main	   attraction	   of	   an	   approach	   along	   these	   lines	   is	   that	   it	   promises	   to	   make	   room	   for	   two	  
apparently	   conflicting	   features	   of	   moral	   judgements,	   namely	   their	   motivational	   force	   and	   their	  
cognitive	   character.	   Moral	   judgements	   appear	   to	   be	   on	   a	   par	   with	   paradigmatic	   cognitive	  
judgements,	   such	   as	   judgements	   about	   shapes	   and	   colours,	   but	   they	   also	   seem	   to	   have	   a	   special	  
relation	   to	  motivation.	   In	   principle,	  we	   expect	   that	   someone	  who	   judges	   that	   he	   ought	   to	   help	   a	  
friend	  will	  be	  motivated	  accordingly,	  and	  the	  same	  is	  true	  if	  someone	  judges	  that	  it	  is	  shameful	  not	  
to	   help.	   Someone	  who	   fails	   to	   be	  motivated	   accordingly	   seems	   to	   suffer	   from	   a	   kind	   of	   practical	  
irrationality,	  such	  as	  weakness	  of	  will.111	  This	  feature	  of	  moral	  judgements	  is	  something	  that	  can,	  it	  
seems,	   be	   explained	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   connection	   between	   the	   judgement	   and	   the	   motivation	  
standardly	  involved	  in	  emotion.	  	  
The	   account	   of	   moral	   judgements	   in	   terms	   of	   fitting	   or	   appropriate	   emotions	   postulates	   a	  
conceptual	   connection	   between	  moral	   concepts	   and	   emotion	   concepts.	   Other	   accounts	   are	  more	  
empirically	   oriented.	   They	   aim	   at	   establishing	   causal	   relations	   between	   emotions	   and	   moral	  
judgements.	   Experiments	   in	   social	   psychology	   suggest	   that	   emotions	   have	   a	   huge	   impact	   on	   our	  
moral	  judgements.	  Whether	  we	  consider	  a	  practice	  to	  be	  morally	  doubtful	  depends	  at	  least	  in	  part	  
on	   whether	   we	   feel	   disgust	   towards	   that	   practice.112,113	   However,	   the	   causal	   relation	   between	  
	  	  
emotions	  and	  moral	  judgements	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  go	  in	  one	  direction	  only,	  for	  the	  judgements	  
we	  make	  given	  our	  education	  and	  socialisation	  are	  likely	  to	  influence	  our	  emotional	  reactions.	  What	  
we	  see	  as	  morally	  wrong,	  for	  instance,	  will	  tend	  to	  trigger	  negative	  reactions.	  	  
Quite	  generally,	  recent	  debates	  suggest	  that	  both	  our	  emotions	  and	  our	  rational	  faculties	  contribute	  
to	   our	  moral	   judgements.	   The	   difficult	   question	   concerns	   the	   exact	   contribution	   of	   emotions	   and	  
reason	   in	   moral	   judgements.	   Insofar	   as	   the	   central	   notion	   in	   neo-­‐sentimentalism	   is	   that	   of	   an	  
appropriate	  emotion,	  which	  is	  fitting	  to	  its	  object,	  this	  approach	  makes	  room	  for	  rational	  assessment	  
of	   emotions.	   The	   same	   is	   true	   of	   recent	   suggestions	   concerning	   the	   causal	   mechanisms	   that	   are	  
responsible	  for	  moral	  judgements.	  According	  to	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  recent	  accounts,	  which	  
has	   been	   proposed	   by	   Shaun	   Nichols,	   the	   mechanism	   responsible	   for	   “core	   moral	   judgements”,	  
which	  concern	  prohibition	  of	  harm,	  depend	  both	  on	  our	  emotions	  and	  our	  rational	  capacities.113	  
Philosophers	  have	  also	  been	   interested	   in	   the	   roles	  of	   specific	  emotions,	   such	  as	  pity,	   compassion	  
and	  sympathy;113-­‐115	  	  love,85,116-­‐118	  and	  respect,119,120	  on	  the	  positive	  side,	  and	  shame;121,122	  guilt;123-­‐124	  
disgust;125	  envy;126	  resentment	  and	  indignation,127,128	  on	  the	  negative	  side.	  Even	  though	  the	  focus	  has	  
mostly	   been	   on	   their	   motivational	   impact,	   each	   of	   these	   emotion	   kinds	   raises	   specific	   questions	  
regarding	   their	  moral	   importance.	  Moreover,	   depending	   on	   the	   favoured	   ethical	   theory,	   different	  
kinds	  of	  emotion	  have	  been	  considered	  central.129	  Thus,	  deontologists,	  according	  to	  whom	  the	  right	  
action	   is	   defined	   in	   terms	  of	   absolute	   rules,	   have	   tended	   to	   focus	  on	   the	   attitude	  of	   respect,	   and	  
more	   specifically	   on	   the	   Kantian	   notion	   of	   respect	   for	   the	   moral	   law.130	   From	   a	   consequentialist	  
perspective,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  right	  action	  is	  the	  one	  that	  has	  the	  best	  overall	  consequences,	  
the	   focus	  has	  been,	  mainly	   following	  Hume94,	  on	   fellow-­‐feelings	   such	  as	  pity	  and	   compassion,	  but	  
also	   on	  what	  Mill131	   considered	   internalized	   punishments,	   such	   as	   shame	   and	   guilt.	   Finally,	   virtue	  
ethicists,	  who	  focus	  not	  so	  much	  on	  right	  action	  as	  on	  character,	  have	  underlined	  the	  role	  of	  a	  great	  
many	   emotions	   in	   the	   exercise	   of	   virtues	   and	   vices.132	   Courage,	   for	   instance,	   is	   plausibly	   taken	   to	  
involve	  not	  so	  much	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  fear	  as	  the	  right	  degree	  of	  fear.	  Virtue	  ethicists	  have	  also	  been	  
the	  first	   to	  promote	  the	   idea	  that	  emotions	  cannot	   just	  be	  taken	  as	  given,	  but	  need	  attention	  and	  
education,	  an	  idea	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  Aristotle.29,115,121,133,134	  
Conclusion.	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	   importance	  of	  emotions	   in	  the	  work	  of	  a	  great	  many	  major	   figures	   in	  the	  history	  of	  
philosophy	  –	  Aristotle,	  Descartes,	  Spinoza,	  Hobbes,	  Hume	  all	  offer	  detailed	  accounts	  of	  the	  emotions	  
–	   contemporary	   philosophical	   interest	   in	   the	   emotions	   is	   relatively	   recent.	   Yet,	   since	   the	   seminal	  
works	   of	   David	   Lyons16,	   Robert	   Gordon135	   and	   Ronald	   de	   Sousa,28	   the	   philosophical	   literature	   on	  
	  	  
emotion	   has	   exploded.	   From	  what	   used	   to	   be	   considered	   a	   relatively	   unimportant	   and	   extremely	  
messy	  terrain	  likely	  to	  defeat	  any	  attempts	  at	  systematic	  theorizing,	  emotions	  have	  become	  one	  of	  
the	   favourite	  playgrounds	  of	  philosophers,	  who	  have	   recognized	   the	   importance	  of	  deepening	  our	  
understanding	  of	  this	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  human	  life.	  This	  is	  manifest	  in	  the	  variety	  and	  richness	  
of	  the	  debates	  around	  which	  the	  contemporary	  philosophical	  discussions	  are	  structured.	  How	  should	  
we	  understand	  the	  relations	  between	  emotions	  and	  other	  affective	  phenomena?	  What	  is	  distinctive	  
in	  the	  way	  emotions	  relate	  us	  with	  our	  surroundings?	  If	  we	  endorse	  the	  idea	  that	  emotions	  display	  
an	  intimate	  relation	  to	  evaluative	  properties,	  how	  best	  to	  model	  this	  relation?	  Are	  emotions	  apt	  to	  
play	   significant	   epistemological	   roles	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   evaluative	   judgements	   they	   typically	   lead	   us	   to	  
make?	  How	  should	  we	  understand	  the	  kinds	  of	  social	  influences	  to	  which	  emotions	  unquestionably	  
lend	   themselves?	   Do	   emotions	   motivate	   us	   essentially,	   or	   is	   their	   relation	   to	   motivation	   much	  
looser?	  What	  sort	  of	  link	  to	  motivation	  do	  moral	  judgements	  have	  and	  how	  does	  this	  constrain	  our	  
conception	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  emotions	  and	  morality?	  In	  the	  short	  space	  of	  this	  overview,	  we	  
have	  had	  more	  than	  one	  opportunity	  to	  highlight	  how	  deeply	  connected	  these	  various	  issues	  are.	  It	  
justifies	   the	   renewed	   interest	   in	   emotions	  of	   philosophers,	   psychologists,	   neurologists	   and	  others,	  
while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   testifying	   to	   the	   complex	   challenges	   that	  must	   be	   faced	   by	   philosophical	  
approaches	  to	  them.	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